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Recent developments in ecological statistics have reached behavioral ecology, and an increasing number of studies now apply
analytical tools that incorporate alternatives to the conventional null hypothesis testing based on significance levels. However, these
approaches continue to receive mixed support in our field. Because our statistical choices can influence research design and the
interpretation of data, there is a compelling case for reaching consensus on statistical philosophy and practice. Here, we provide a brief
overview of the recently proposed approaches and open an online forum for future discussion (https://bestat.ecoinformatics
.org/). From the perspective of practicing behavioral ecologists relying on either correlative or experimental data, we review the most
relevant features of information theoretic approaches, Bayesian inference, and effect size statistics. We also discuss concerns about data
quality, missing data, and repeatability. We emphasize the necessity of moving away from a heavy reliance on statistical significance
while focusing attention on biological relevance and effect sizes, with the recognition that uncertainty is an inherent feature of
biological data. Furthermore, we point to the importance of integrating previous knowledge in the current analysis, for which novel
approaches offer a variety of tools. We note, however, that the drawbacks and benefits of these approaches have yet to be carefully
examined in association with behavioral data. Therefore, we encourage a philosophical change in the interpretation of statistical
outcomes, whereas we still retain a pluralistic perspective for making objective statistical choices given the uncertainties around
different approaches in behavioral ecology. We provide recommendations on how these concepts could be made apparent in the
presentation of statistical outputs in scientific papers. Key words: BeStat, Bonferroni correction, frequentist approach, information
theoretic approach, measurement error, model selection, P value, prior, statistical power. [Behav Ecol 20:1363–1375 (2009)]
Behavioral ecologists rely on statistical analyses to makeinferences from observational or experimental data. How-
ever, statistics is a dynamically developing discipline, and there
is little consensus on how to choose from the available statis-
tical methods or how to present results. For the last several dec-
ades, null hypothesis testing (NHT) based on statistical
significance levels (P values) has dominated data analysis in
the study of behavior (or other variables in the focus of be-
havioral ecologists). Recently, analytical tools that incorporate
alternative statistical philosophies have been highlighted
(e.g., Burnham and Anderson 2002; Gill 2002; Rushton
et al. 2004; Clark and Gelfand 2006; Nakagawa and Cuthill
2007), but their use is still limited in behavioral ecology,
mainly because of their unfamiliarity and of the prevalence
of NHT-biased statistical training (Stephens, Buskirk, and del
Rio 2007). Hereafter, we use the term ‘‘new’’ or ‘‘recent’’ sta-
tistical methods to mean new or recent to behavioral ecology.
The strength of behavioral studies in the field or laboratory
is that they allow trait manipulation, which is a powerful way to
reveal causal relationships (Quinn and Keough 2002). Nearly
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half of the papers published in ‘‘Behavioral Ecology’’ employ
experimental approaches, and the vast majority of them
use NHT-based statistics to make inferences from the data
(Stephens, Buskirk, Hayward, and del Rio 2007). Controlled
experiments are designed to reveal the causal relationship
between 2 variables and to reduce the number of confound-
ing factors experimentally by reducing the variance in con-
founding factors or by balanced group assignment. In
carefully designed experiments, balanced or randomized
group assignment allows the data to be analyzed with straight-
forward statistical tests like analysis of variance (ANOVA),
t-test, regression or mixed-models (Ruxton 2006; Stephens,
Buskirk, and del Rio 2007). However, although NHT is appro-
priate for many, carefully designed experiments, ‘‘new’’ statis-
tical tools are not inappropriate for analyzing experimental
data, and, in fact, it is misleading to believe that experimental
approach necessarily calls for NHT.
The outcomes of ANOVAs and t-tests can be interpreted by
using ‘‘novel’’ methods, which provide flexibly interpretable
results irrespective to whether the data are collected experi-
mentally or observationally (Lukacs et al. 2007). For example,
Information Theoretic (IT) and Bayesian inferences allow
complex modeling of multiple hypotheses and to incorporate
prior knowledge into the analysis of experimental data (see
below). Moreover, experimental data like any results in behav-
ioral ecology could be quantified by effect sizes (see below). It
follows that the advantages of the outlined methods, over
NHT, seem more relevant to interpretation, rather than the
experimental design per se. Accordingly, subsequent discus-
sions and examples equally correspond to the analysis of both
observational and experimental data.
In general, the statistical tools one adopts have consequen-
ces for the biological inferences that can be made from statis-
tical analyses. NHT involves ‘‘binary’’ thinking (i.e., an effect
was either demonstrated or not) and frames research hypoth-
eses in the context of falsification. Although NHT does not pre-
clude the estimation of parameters that reflect the strength of
a biological effect, the strong attention paid to P values and
arbitrary interpretations from NHT results shift the focus from
biological significance to statistical significance (Stephens,
Buskirk, and del Rio 2007). In contrast, recently proposed
alternatives inherently treat biological effects or evidence on
a continuous scale and focus on modeling of data instead of
hypothesis testing. They allow the simultaneous assessment of
multiple competing biological hypotheses that are translated
to statistical models (for simplicity, we assume that one statis-
tical model or hypothesis corresponds to one biological hy-
pothesis, and hereafter we refer to ‘‘hypotheses’’ in a general
sense covering both levels; however, see some relevant discus-
sion on http://bestat.ecoinformatics.org). These alternative
methods typically deal with the magnitude of effects and their
biological relevance.
The statistical framework used for analysis also influences the
manner in which researchers report results. Traditionally, the
use of NHT has put high emphasis on the presentation of sig-
nificance thresholds, whereas effect sizes and their precision
were of secondary concern. Furthermore, the historical report-
ing of P values has implications for future syntheses of
information using meta-analyses because they provide little in-
formation on the magnitude and direction of a research out-
come. These problems are compounded because NHT use can
also lead to publication bias (i.e., significant results are pub-
lished preferentially) because many nonsignificant results are
likely to remain in ‘‘file-drawers’’ (Rosenthal 1979; Møller and
Jennions 2001). However, recently NHT has been more often
combined with the presentation of effect sizes. We welcome
this trend because it partly solves some of the issues by intro-
ducing a continuous perspective to biological evidence.
Consequently, the shift that we are experiencing in ecological
statistics is expected to have a strong influence on how we con-
duct studies of behavior, as the statistical choice applied can in-
fluence research design and the interpretation of data. Hence,
there is a compelling case for behavioral ecologists to become
familiar with developments in the field of statistics. To this
end, Garamszegi and Nakagawa organized a post-conference
symposium for the 12th International Behavioral Ecology
Congress, held at Cornell University in 2008, to cover a topical
review of various methods. Our goal was to initiate a discussion
about the most recent advancements in ecological statistics
that were emerging in behavioral ecological studies but
were not widely appreciated. These topics included 1) IT
approaches that allow the comparative evaluation of multiple
biological hypotheses; 2) Bayesian inference, in which new
empirical evidence is combined with past knowledge to up-
date or newly infer the probability of the hypotheses being
tested; 3) issues about effect sizes and confidence intervals
(CIs), which differentiate between the strength of biological
effects and the precision by which these effects could be esti-
mated; and 4) concerns about data quality and repeatability
that undermine the biological relevance of the statistical
results.
This paper synthesizes much of the discussions from this
symposium by providing illustrative examples to demonstrate
what these approaches offer in association to behavioral data
(both experimental and correlational). Throughout this re-
view, we avoid suggesting general support for one method over
another. Rather, in accordance with recommended practices in
ecology (Stephens et al. 2005), we emphasize the importance
of a pluralistic approach, by which the researcher must care-
fully choose the most appropriate statistical method based on
the questions at hand. Along this line, we consider the NHT
approach as a mathematically correct tool that, if interpreted
correctly, can still be used for testing certain questions in
behavioral ecology. In the following sections, we discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of recent statistical approaches.
MULTIMODEL INFERENCE, MODEL SELECTION, AND
INFORMATION THEORY
Behavioral ecologists often deal with complex systems and seek
to understand how interacting genetic and environmental
factors have shaped behavioral phenotypes. Such complex
systems are composed of a large number of potential relation-
ships between different factors, and a scientific study aims at
identifying predictors in the most appropriate combination
that are responsible for a certain biological phenomenon. This
task requires statistical approaches that can handle data with
multiple predictors and can be used to evaluate different bio-
logical hypotheses in the form of statistical models, which sum-
marize the predicted relationship between the response and
predictor variables.
Multi-predictor problems in ecological and behavioral re-
search have typically been treated by model simplification
approaches using threshold-based removal-reintroduction algo-
rithms (thresholds usually being P , 0.05–0.10), that is, step-
wise selection (Miller 1992). The purpose of such a model
simplification procedure is to follow an iteration process based
on significance level to reach a single, parsimonious model,
which contains few variables only but has a strong descriptive
value (Ginzburg and Jensen 2004). The stepwise method, how-
ever, has been criticized for multiple reasons, including the use
of arbitrary significance thresholds, biased distribution of the
resulting parameter estimates, incongruence of different selec-
tion algorithms, redundancy of repeated parameter testing,
and the poor coverage of possible model space and potentially
incorrect reliance on a single final model (Anderson et al.
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2000; Whittingham et al. 2006). Accordingly, many authors
warn against the use of stepwise selection and P value ap-
proaches for model selection and subsequent parameter esti-
mation (Whittingham et al. 2006; Lukacs et al. 2007; Mundry
and Nunn 2009). In spite of this, stepwise methods have been
and are still being commonly used in our field, and we suspect
that, because of their easiness, they will continue serving for
some comparisons and exploratory analyses in the future. We
expect this to occur when the interest is to determine which set
of variables provides the best explanation for the variation in
the data or when the aim is to contrast results with previous
studies that used the same stepwise approach. Note that a re-
cent comparison of the predictive ability of seven model selec-
tion approaches revealed that stepwise-based variable selection
performed similarly to other algorithms when applied to 12
ecological datasets (Murtaugh 2009). However, we advocate
that the shortcomings of stepwise methods should be carefully
examined when interpreting results.
The recently introduced IT model comparison method
allows the concurrent assessment of several, competing
biological hypotheses that are defined a priori (Burnham
and Anderson 2002; Johnson and Omland 2004). Information
criteria (such as Akaike’s information criterion [AIC]) quantify
the relative fit of each candidate hypothesis (represented as
a statistical model) based on the balance between the likeli-
hood of the data given the model and parsimony in the num-
ber of parameters (Burnham and Anderson 2002). An entire
suite of models reflecting different biologically relevant hypoth-
eses can be ranked based on their relative criterion values with-
out the need for a threshold of significance. Although probably
the most widely used criterion in ecology is AIC (a reason why
we also focus on it for our demonstrative purposes), it is just
one criterion in the IT framework. Examples of other criteria
include Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and deviance in-
formation criterion (DIC) (Congdon 2006; Claeskens and
Hjort 2008; Ward 2008). The result of an IT process is the list
of considered models that are ranked according to the infor-
mation criterion used. A formal strength of evidence for each
model can be acquired by calculating model likelihoods or AIC
weights. Such information can be used for effective biological
interpretations because the comparison of these metrics in the
form of evidence ratio permits evidentiary statements about the
plausibility of different hypotheses, given the data (see examples
in Figures 1 and 2). Therefore, ITapproaches offer more reliable
Figure 1
Analyses of data with multiple predictors using NHT and IT
approaches. In a comparative analysis of Australian birds in the
superfamily Meliphagoidea, Symonds and Johnson (2006) sought to
identify what factors best-predicted patterns of mean abundance (the
density at which individuals of each species exist). They tested the
prediction that species that exploited a greater number of niches
would tend to exist at higher abundances than species that were
highly specialized. They split niche breadth into 2 components, diet
breadth (the number of different food types eaten) and habitat
breadth (a diversity index of how many habitats the species was found
in). They also considered the effect of body mass and latitudinal
position based on the findings of previously published studies of bird
abundance.
They initially employed bivariate Pearson correlations in
a phylogenetic generalized least squares framework and showed
that body mass, latitude, diet breadth, and abundance, all
appeared to be interlinked and correlated in some way. Habitat
breadth did not show any significant associations with any other
variable and was disregarded. Therefore they chose body mass,
latitude, and diet breadth to be predictors of abundance in a general
linear model:
Variable Slope SE t P
Body mass 23.771 1.124 23.24 0.001
Latitude 0.013 0.004 3.41 0.001
Diet breadth 0.023 0.027 0.84 0.404
The model R2 ¼ 0.111, F3,114 ¼ 5.894, P ¼ 0.001.
These results showed that body mass and latitude were the only
significant predictors of mean abundance in these birds. Stepwise
regression also produces a model that contains only these 2
parameters. Symonds and Johnson (2006)therefore concluded that
neither aspect of niche breadth had any role in predicting patterns of
local abundance. However, if they had considered an IT approach
using AIC, their analysis would have led to a more cautious
conclusion.
Starting with the a priori knowledge that both body mass and
latitude are important predictors of abundance in these birds (based
on previous studies, not the above analysis), and should be included,
we eliminate comparisons of all possible combinations of variables (an
all-subset approach) and focus on the question of how models
including aspects of niche breadth compare to the model with body
mass and latitude alone. There is no a priori reason to consider that
interaction or polynomial terms might be important so they are not
included.
Figure 1 continued
Model AIC DAICa wb ERc
Body mass 1 latitude 2178.44 0 0.33
Body mass 1 latitude 1
habitat breadth
2178.23 0.21 0.30 1.1
Body mass 1 latitude 1
diet breadth
2177.65 0.79 0.22 1.5
Body mass 1 latitude 1
habitat breadth 1 diet
breadth
2176.88 1.56 0.15 2.1
a
The difference in AIC between the first-ranked model and the given
model.
b Akaike weight, that is, the weight of evidence that a given model is the
best approximating model.
c Evidence ratio, model weight of the first-ranked model relative to that
of the given model.
Although the model that includes only body mass and latitude is still
the most likely, we cannot say with certainty that it is the only model
that could apply to the data. With an Akaike weight of only 0.33 (i.e., it
could be considered to be 33% probable that it is the best model), it is
only just a better model than the ones that also contain habitat
breadth and diet breadth (it is only 1.1 times more likely than model
including habitat breadth). We cannot confidently rule out an effect
of either aspect of niche breadth. Individual variable weights obtained
by model averaging also support a more nuanced interpretation:
Variable Averaged slope 95% CI summed wa
Body mass 22.483 20.760 to 24.206 1.00
Latitude 0.010 0.002 to 0.018 1.00
Habitat breadth 0.113 20.052 to 0.278 0.45
Diet breadth 0.030 20.027 to 0.087 0.37
a The summed Akaike weight for the variable.
With parameter weights of 0.45 and 0.37, we can interpret aspects of
niche breadth as having around 40% probability that they may indeed
play a role in determining patterns on abundance in these birds.
Notice also that the averaged slope estimates are different than those
obtained in the single model that Symonds and Johnson
(2006)produced. Although model details were not crucial to that
particular analysis, in other cases (e.g., estimation of allometric
slopes), AIC analyses and model averaging can provide different
estimates of scaling exponents than consideration of single models.
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model selection (but not necessarily model simplification) based
on the simultaneous evaluation of multiple hypotheses.
The IT methods can also be used for parameter estimation.
In fact, the strength of the IT approaches is that they allow
model averaging, a technique that provides parameter esti-
mates that incorporate model uncertainty and are based on
multiple statistical models (Johnson and Omland 2004;
Richards 2005; Claeskens and Hjort 2008). Model averaging,
therefore, shifts the focus from the probability of models to
the independent effect of each explanatory variable summed
across supported models (see example in Figure 1). Frequently,
many alternative models are all approximately equally likely
(i.e., have similar AIC values). In every single model (as in
a single ‘‘best’’ model), estimates and standard errors (SEs)
are conditional on the model being correct. However, if we
are unsure about the model structure, point estimates and
SEs should incorporate this source of uncertainty. To do so,
parameter estimates from alternative candidate models are
weighted by the evidence for the respective models (e.g., mea-
sured as AIC weights) and are averaged across all candidate
models (or a subset of best models, Burnham and Anderson
2002). It is also possible to identify the parameters that are
more strongly represented across all well-supported models
and are thus more likely to have important predictive value.
This is done by calculating the cumulative evidence for the
models containing a particular parameter (Burnham and
Anderson 2002). Parameters can then be ranked according
to their representation in models with good fit to the data
(Burnham and Anderson 2002).
In addition to model parameters and model fits, another
way of dealing with the relative importance of different
predictors is to use an estimate of the explained variation
(Burnham and Anderson 2002). The overall variation ex-
plained by any model relative to a random/null expectation
can be calculated based on the log likelihoods of these mod-
els containing different combinations of predictors. By the
careful consideration of the models being compared, the
explained variance approach provides a powerful tool for
assessing the contribution of predictors of interest. Such
a statistic is a useful accessory to model fit statistics because
although a model may be ranked as best in a given set it may
explain only a small proportion of variance in the focal
variable (Eberhardt 2003).
The initial model set should closely reflect the biological and
theoretical background as well as research design (see example
in Figure 1). Although the subsequent ranking of all models
based on criterion values may lend support to more than one
nonexclusive hypothesis, model selection results will be con-
ditional on the initial model set considered. However, the
decision which 2models to include in the initial model set is
controversial and subject to philosophical issues (see Anderson
2008). Selecting from a large number of possible parameter
combinations is sometimes cognitively intractable. The con-
struction of a plausible, multiparameter candidate model set
is left to the judgment of the model builder. If no prior in-
formation is available, decisions about which initial models to
include may be challenging and require exploratory data anal-
ysis or the simplification of models containing a large set of
potentially important terms.
In addition to the difficulties associated with the definition
of the initial model set, there are other issues concerning the
IT-based method that warrant attention and future test. For
Figure 2
Interpreting experimental results by using the IT approach. A field study on the collared flycatcher (Ficedula albicollis) tested the predictions
of parasite-mediated sexual selection theory by following the effect of an experimental immune challenge on song production (Garamszegi
et al. 2004). An NHT-based approach demonstrated that sheep red blood cell injected males significantly decreased their song rate after the
manipulation of health status, whereas control birds receiving physiological water (placebo) did not change their song output. By contrast,
other song traits, such as song duration, were not affected significantly by the treatment. A reanalysis of the same data using an IT approach
provided similar conclusions, but it gave explicit statements about the plausibility of different hypotheses. AIC scores for the 2 hypotheses
(here H0: no treatment effect and H1: treatment effect) in association with song rate showed that more support could be obtained for the
alternative hypothesis than to the null hypothesis. This corresponds to an evidence ratio of 9.3, which might be judged as ‘‘given the
available data, a difference in the change in song rate between the 2 experimental groups is approximately 9.3 times more likely than no
difference having occurred.’’ This suggests limited (perhaps moderate) evidence for a treatment effect on song rate (see Lukacs et al. 2007),
contrary to the result from NHT, which emphasizes that the evidence is significant. There is more uncertainty about the relative support of
different hypotheses in relation to song duration. The NHT approach fails to reject the H0 hypothesis, and the researcher is tempted to
conclude that there is no treatment effect. However, the IT-AIC approach, given the available data, more or less equally supports both
hypotheses (DAIC , 2, evidence ratio ,, 10). Such uncertainties are also evident when applying interpretations based on the effect sizes
theorem (see Cohen’s d).
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example, it may be questionable to assume that the application
of the statistical concept of parsimony based on model com-
plexity and fit, which is at the heart of IT-AIC methods, has
any biological relevance (Guthery et al. 2005). Moreover,
there is no generally accepted benchmark for ranking com-
peting models, as there are different information criteria
(other than AIC) available for model comparison, which all
have different consequences for model selection and subse-
quent parameter estimation (Claeskens and Hjort 2008). Fi-
nally, AIC has been suggested to be prone to overfitting,
which results in that the most supported models are too com-
plex, and often include variables and interactions, with very
small effects (Pan 1999; Forster 2000; Seghouane 2006).
The scope of this paper only allows coverage of the most
important philosophical aspects of the IT approaches based
on AIC and to provide some examples (Figures 1 and 2). For
those who intend to implement AIC-based and other selection
methods into their research practice, we suggest Anderson
(2008) as an introduction to the topic and Burnham and An-
derson (2002) and Claeskens and Hjort (2008) as more ad-
vanced readings. In addition, an upcoming special issue in
‘‘Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology’’ will deal with particular
problems that researchers in our field may meet when analyz-
ing behavioral data in an IT framework (Garamszegi 2010).
BAYESIAN APPROACH
Biologists including behavioral ecologists have traditionally
had strong loyalty to the falsificationist approach as proposed
by Karl Popper (1963), in which evidence is used to challenge
scientific theory until it can be rejected. In other words, data
are used to examine a null hypothesis against a single alter-
native hypothesis. This tradition relies on the binary nature of
questions that researchers can ask in simple experiments by
testing hypotheses about single parameter causation (i.e.,
means are different between the control and experimental
groups). Although the NHT approach offers an appropriate,
and mathematically correct, statistical framework for con-
trolled experiments (Stephens et al. 2005; Whittingham
et al. 2006), the resulting P values can only be used to make
inferences about the validity of the null hypothesis, whereas
the degree to which the data support alternative hypotheses
remains unexplored (Lukacs et al. 2007). The philosophy of
the falsification approach (i.e., the rejection or acceptance of
a single hypothesis) thus ignores the uncertainty about the
best explanation that can be given for an observed phenom-
enon (Stephens, Buskirk, and del Rio 2007). Evidence against
the null hypothesis may be mistaken as evidence for a specific
alternative hypothesis. Bayesian thinking, on the other hand,
recognizes that data rarely provide full support for a single
hypothesis, but they should only affect the extent to which we
interpret which hypothesis is more likely. Note that this phil-
osophical approach also applies to the IT methods. However,
only Bayesian methods can make ‘‘true’’ probabilistic state-
ments on any hypothesis (note that Akaike weights used in
IT approaches are often treated as representing model prob-
abilities, i.e., the probabilities of hypotheses, but Akaike
weights are only the approximations of such probabilities
under a large-sample size condition, by assuming each model
has equal probabilities prior to data collection; Burnham and
Anderson 2002; McCarthy 2007).
Bayesian statistics has recently gained popularity in many
areas including phylogeny construction and complex ecologi-
cal modeling (Ronquist 2004; Clark 2005; Clark and Gelfand
2006; McCarthy 2007). Behavioral ecologists seem to be
among the last to employ this flexible framework in their rou-
tine analysis (Stephens, Buskirk, and del Rio 2007). This may
be because researchers are unfamiliar with this approach or
they think that it is inappropriate to analyze experimental
data. Bayesian statistics does have concepts and properties
which some researchers in the field may not be familiar with
(e.g., prior and posterior probabilities; see below), but this
does not necessarily mean that the statistical background of
behavioral ecologists is useless in the face of Bayesian statistics.
Moreover, it is misleading to assume that Bayesian methods
preclude experimentation, as the underlying philosophy is
concerned with how data are analyzed and interpreted but
not with how they are collected. Here, we outline the key
properties of Bayesian statistics that differentiate it from the
well-known NHT tools. Readers are recommended to consult
with accessible introductory books (Gelman and Hill 2007;
McCarthy 2007) on Bayesian statistics or more thorough re-
views (Gelman et al. 1995; Gill 2002; Congdon 2003, 2005,
2006).
The philosophy of Bayesian statistics is fundamentally differ-
ent from the one we follow in traditional statistics (e.g., based
on NHT). In traditional statistics, we generally rely on the fre-
quentist viewpoint of probability, which is the expected fre-
quency of occurrence of an event in a large number of trials
given a particular statistical null hypothesis. According to
the Bayesian definition of probability, it is the plausibility of
an event given the evidence of the event. To assess the proba-
bility of a hypothesis, Bayesians specify a certain prior proba-
bility, which reflects our current belief in it and is then
updated in the light of the new data. More precisely, Bayesian
statistics allows us to obtain the probability of hypotheses (or
parameters of interest) given observed data, as described by
Bayes’ theorem:
PrðhjDÞ ¼ PrðhÞ3PrðDjhÞ
PrðDÞ ;
where h is a parameter to be estimated (e.g., a intercept or
slope; or h can be read as a hypothesis) and D represents data;
Pr(h) (probability of parameter or hypothesis) is what is often
referred to as the prior probability or prior, Pr(h|D) (proba-
bility of parameter or hypothesis given the data) is the poste-
rior probability or posterior, Pr(D|h) (probability of the data
given a parameter or hypothesis) is referred to as the likeli-
hood function (in the NHT context, the P value is the prob-
ability of data given the null hypothesis being true), and Pr(D)
is the probability of observing data (it acts as a normalizing
constant). Therefore, the posterior distribution is propor-
tional to the combination of the prior distribution and the
likelihood function. Accordingly, the goal of Bayesian statistics
is the estimation of posterior distribution with a given prior
and likelihood function. Therefore, the Bayesian approach
focuses on the probability of hypotheses, given the data,
whereas NHT is concerned with the probability of data, given
a null hypothesis.
With Bayesian inference, evidence or observations are used
to update or to newly infer the probability that a hypothesis (a
parameter) may be true through Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) iterations. A detailed description of MCMC methods
is beyond the scope of this paper (see suggested references on
Bayesian statistics and for more in-depth treatment of this
topic, Gamerman and Lopes 2006). In brief, a Markov chain
is a sequence of events where an event at time point t is only
influenced by an event at t – 1, whereas the Monte Carlo
process is a simulation using random number generators
(i.e., random sampling). As a result of these 2 processes work-
ing together, MCMC methods provide a posterior distribution
of each parameter from which we can easily obtain means,
SEs, and 95% credible intervals (a Bayesian version of CIs).
The samples from the posterior distribution of a parameter
are parameter values that are likely given the data, and the
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density distribution of the samples shows values of the param-
eter that are more likely than others. The Bayesian 95% cred-
ible interval contains the true value of the parameter with
a probability equal to 0.95, given the model, the data, and
the prior (for accounts of subtle and clear differences
between confidence and credible intervals see Hilborn and
Mangel 1997; McCarthy 2007). Bayesian results, therefore,
can be easily interpreted in a manner most behavioral ecolo-
gists are already used to.
To obtain a posterior distribution from a Markov chain, ‘‘pri-
ors’’ are required. Priors are used to establish initial probability
distributions for the parameters in the model, and they set out
the parameter space where the Markov chain is allowed to ex-
plore. Therefore, in a Bayesian framework, the evaluation of
hypotheses is fundamentally linked to preceding information
and assumptions (see example in Figure 3). By contrast, the
assimilation of previous information into NHT approaches is
subjective, as we focus on post hoc explanations of unex-
pected results that contradict our predictions and previously
available information. The careful choice of priors in Bayesian
statistics by incorporating knowledge from previous findings
can increase the precision at a lower sample size (note that an
analogous issue is termed as ‘‘statistical’’ power in a NHT
framework). For example, previous studies suggest treating
males with testosterone reduces paternal care in many bird
species (Wingfield et al. 1987), and we may reasonably predict
a prior probability distribution for reduction in care in a bird
species subjected to testosterone treatment. Then, we may be
able to reduce the number of birds involved in a study where
effects of testosterone on paternal care and associated ques-
tions are investigated. This is because the prior increases the
precision of the posterior estimate (or reduces its SE) pro-
vided that data more or less support the prior evidence and
that the variance associated with the prior is small compared
with variance associated with data. Therefore, the appropriate
use of priors increases scientific efficiency and also has welfare
implications.
However, choosing and finding appropriate priors is proba-
bly the most contentious issue among Bayesian statisticians
(Gelman et al. 1995; Gill 2002). If we choose incorrect priors
for parameters of interest, such choice will lead to biased
parameter estimates, incorrect SEs, and thus possibly incor-
rect conclusions, especially when the sample size is small.
Moreover, we may have difficulty in defining prior distribu-
tions for certain parameters because, say, we work on a species,
which has never been studied or we investigate totally new
aspects of behavior using a new technique. In such cases,
values referred to as uninformative priors can be used; these
Figure 3
Bayesian versus NHT approaches: Incorporating previous results via a prior. Nakagawa et al. (2007) conducted a series of meta-analyses to assess
the function of bib size in male house sparrows (Passer domesticus). The results showed that there was a strong correlation between male bib size
and status (competitive ability) after integrating 15 effect size estimates from 12 different populations (r ¼ 0.463; 95% CI ¼ 0.290–0.608). This
constitutes a good example for a ‘‘badge of status’’ in the house sparrow. Now imagine that a researcher tested this relationship in an island
population of house sparrows. She observed aggressive encounters among 15 male sparrows and measured their bib sizes. The statistical result
was nonsignificant according to NHT (r ¼ 0.266, t13¼ 0.991, P ¼ 0.339). She might be tempted to conclude that the badge of status hypothesis
does not hold in this island population. This, however, is the fallacy of interpreting lack of evidence against the null hypothesis as evidence for it.
Although this might seem obvious in this particular case, this fallacy is an inherent issue in NHT. The conclusion could have been different if she
had been a Bayesian. The correlation between bib size and status after incorporating the above meta-analytic result supports the badge of status
hypothesis (posterior mode r ¼ 0.422, 95% credible interval ¼ 0.102–0.657). Note that this estimate does not simply reflect the prior information
but that incorporates the limited amount of new data from the island, which results in relatively large credibility intervals. Notably, if she uses an
uninformative prior, the Bayesian estimation would have been similar to the classical correlation (posterior mode r ¼ 0.262, 95% credible
interval ¼ 20.269 to 0.669; see figure). She could report both results with the informative and uninformative priors and discuss the implications
of both results. Such a formal integration of prior knowledge will provide more careful assessments of the current result in relation to the
previous research. Hence, the Bayesian method is essentially meta-analytic, that is, reflecting new data in the light of prior information, and
naturally shifts the focus to effect size rather than significance thresholds. The figure shows the visual presentations of probability distributions of
the priors and posteriors.
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priors have ‘‘flat’’ probability distributions with equal proba-
bility assigned to a large range of parameter values (or hypoth-
eses). When uninformative priors are used, estimates from
frequentist and Bayesian methods are usually similar. How-
ever, Bayesian statistics may often be the only solution for
problems that cannot be traced in a classical framework (Gill
2002; McCarthy 2007) because of their flexibility in model
building. Figure 3 demonstrates how prior information can
be efficiently incorporated into a Bayesian framework.
Bayesian statistics outperforms frequentist methods in sev-
eral respects. In a frequentist approach, parameter estimates
are usually to a large extent restricted by the assumed proba-
bility distributions (hidden in the assumptions of statistical
models) and can thus be unreliable (Gelman et al. 1995; Gill
2002; Gelman and Hill 2007). For example, in the classical
framework, SEs for variances are usually approximated assum-
ing normal distributions of these variances (given the fact that
variances cannot go below zero, variances are usually not nor-
mally distributed). The Bayesian approach, on the other
hand, is less restricted by certain probability distributions.
Furthermore, parameter estimates can easily incorporate
various sources of uncertainties. For example, posterior and
prior distributions depict stochastic variations, by which varia-
tions in trait values caused by measurement errors or within-
individual fluctuations are captured (van Dongen 2001). Prior
distributions can deal with uncertainties around biological
assumptions and predictions, for which previous knowledge
can be taken into account. Posterior distributions allow state-
ments about the probability of a hypothesis or that a parame-
ter falls within a particular range (Gill 2002; Congdon 2003).
Moreover, in a comparative study of trait variation across spe-
cies, the application of the Bayesian approach can treat un-
certainties about estimating phylogenetic relationships (Pagel
et al. 2004; Pagel and Meade 2006). In this context, posterior
distributions are obtained from evolutionary models fitted to
millions of statistically supported phylogenetic trees. Conse-
quently, with Bayesian methods more reliable statistical mod-
eling is possible for various and complex biological problems,
even when nonnormal data and small sample sizes are used
(Carlin and Louis 2000). Furthermore, model selection can
be conducted using criterion-based approaches described in
the previous section although criteria different from AIC such
as BIC and DIC or Bayes Factors (BF) are more often used
(Congdon 2003, 2005, 2006). Finally, Bayesian approaches
can be employed to effectively deal with missing data and
zero-inflated distributions (see below). In fact, the estimation
of unobserved data is an inherent feature of the Bayesian
technique, as it is the by-product of MCMC modeling, by
which the posterior distributions of the parameters are ob-
tained.
CIs ALONG WITH EFFECT SIZES
Statistically significant results may be demonstrated even when
the effects are negligibly small biologically, given sufficiently
large sample sizes. This problem is relatively rare in behavioral
ecology, where samples tend to be relatively small and any sta-
tistically significant result is almost certain to represent a mean-
ingful effect. Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse the
P value with the magnitude of effects of interest, as P is sen-
sitive to sample size (Nakagawa and Cuthill 2007). The impor-
tance of an effect and the precision of its estimate are
statistically characterized by effect size and the associated
CIs (Cohen 1994; Rosenthal 1994; Grafen and Hails 2002).
Effect sizes describe biological patterns along a continuum by
using a common currency metric (often in units of standard
deviations [SDs]), which makes results easily interpretable
and comparable across studies. Effect sizes are estimated from
samples, and the robustness of the estimates is manifested in
their CIs. In this framework, small effects (that would be non-
significant by using NHT) can be informative. If they are
surrounded by narrow CIs, then the researchers can have high
confidence that the true biological effect is weak. In contrast,
a result with a very large CI on the effect size (even if it is
significant in NHT), which can be of intermediate or large
magnitude, cannot reasonably be used to conclude that the
effect is large. This is because broad CIs may also imply that
the true effect is actually weak, but based on the available
sample it can be estimated with considerable uncertainty
(see further differences between interpretations based on
NHT and effect size theorem in Figures 2 and 4). Hence CIs
should always accompany effect sizes. Accordingly, reporting
effect sizes and their CIs has become a recommended practice
in biology, although this recommendation has not permeated
general statistical practices in behavioral ecology (Nakagawa
2004; Garamszegi 2006).
There are 2 broad categories in what is referred to as effect
size: unstandardized effect sizes (e.g., regression coefficients
and mean differences) and standardized effect sizes (e.g., cor-
relation coefficients, Cohen’s d and Hedges’ d) (Cohen 1988;
Rosenthal 1994; Nakagawa and Cuthill 2007). Standardized
effect sizes or dimensionless effect statistics are particularly
useful because these statistics are comparable across studies
and are easy to calculate even with a calculator or spreadsheet
(for an extended discussion on problems associated with ef-
fect size calculations see Nakagawa and Cuthill 2007). How-
ever, the correct calculation of CIs around standardized effect
sizes may appear a challenging task for behavioral ecologists
because this necessitates the use of noncentral t and F distri-
butions, which are far from being practically used in our field
and in conventional statistical packages. The approximate
width of 95% CIs for an effect size can be derived from the
asymptotic SE for the effect size, which is the most commonly
used estimation method in practice. Bootstrap resampling
provides a simple and robust method for calculating statistics
that do not have simple sampling distributions (Efron and
Tibshirani 1993). Given random sampling and sufficiently
large sample size, the distribution of effect sizes in bootstrap
samples simulates the probability distribution of effect sizes in
the population. One can therefore calculate the effect size for
thousands of bootstrap samples drawn from the original em-
pirical sample and then obtain the 95% CI by determining the
range of frequency distribution which includes 95% of those
effect sizes (Manly 1991; Kelley 2005). Routine presentation of
(standardized) effect sizes and their CIs will encourage re-
searchers to view their results in the context of previous re-
search because this statistic is independent of the scale on
which variables were measured and the statistical design they
came from (Thompson 2002; Figure 4).
Reporting effect sizes with SEs (or CIs) will also facilitate the
incorporation of results into future meta-analyses (Lajeunesse
and Forbes 2003), which has become the standard method for
synthesizing published research in biology (Arnquist and
Wooster 1995). However, an emerging challenge for ecologi-
cal meta-analysis in biology is how to generalize research and
pool effect sizes when research is replicated across a diversity
of taxa. The problem is that research outcomes of closely
related taxa may not represent independent pieces of informa-
tion (Felsenstein 1985). This may threaten the validity of quan-
titative reviews because the statistical assumption of
independence in meta-analysis is violated (Hedges and Olkin
1985). Meta-analysis also assumes homogeneity of variances
among effect sizes, but effect size data with a phylogenetic
structure can violate this assumption because taxa may have
evolved at different rates (Harvey and Pagel 1991). Recent
statistical developments that account for phylogenetic
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Figure 4
Interpreting experimental results by using the effect size theorem. Therrien et al. (2008) investigated the trade-off between maintenance and
reproduction in the white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus). In this experimental study, the researchers compared nursing behavior of fawns between
a food-restricted and a control group. Based on the significance of the treatment effect in the statistical analyses, the study concluded that 4 of 6 variables
(total time spent suckling, suckling frequency, number of rejected attempts, and number of solicitations) were affected by the treatment, whereas the
remaining 2 variables (mean duration of suckling bouts and the number of butts per suckling bout) did not differ between experimental groups (a).
This pattern was consistent between periods and suckling conditions.
a) (modified from Therrien en al. 2008)
Own mother Allosuckling
F df P F df P
0–30 days
Time spent suckling (s)/h 22.73 1,14 ,0.001 13.08 1,30 0.001
Suckling bouts/h 33.61 1,14 ,0.001 13.53 1,30 ,0.001
Solicitations/h 21.78 1,14 ,0.001 7.41 1,30 0.01
Rejected suckling attempts/h 18.68 1,14 ,0.001 5.26 1,30 0.03
Mean duration of suckling bouts (s) 0.88 1,14 0.37 1.81 1,30 0.33
Number of butts in the udder/suckling minute 2.61 1,14 0.13 0.65 1,30 0.43
30–80 days
Time spent suckling (s)/h 7.21 1,11 0.02 8.42 1,23 0.01
Suckling bouts/h 8.95 1,11 0.01 11.7 1,23 ,0.01
Solicitations/h 11.91 1,11 0.01 11.87 1,23 ,0.01
Rejected suckling attempts/h 11.19 1,11 0.01 11.34 1,23 ,0.01
Mean duration of suckling bouts (s) 0 1,11 0.98 0.06 1,23 0.82
Number of butts in the udder/suckling minute 1.47 1,11 0.26 0.12 1,23 0.74
However, interpretations based on effect sizes and 95% CI would allow more careful conclusions (b). Effect sizes and their CIs for the former 4
behavioral traits fall within the range of medium to strong effects sensu Cohen (1988). However, these effects tend to be systematically weaker in
the first period (0–30 days of lactation) in the case of allosuckling. Moreover, CIs cover quite broad ranges when data are limited (e.g., see the
cases when fawns are nursed by their own mother), which raises uncertainty around the estimates of weaker effects. Accordingly, it would be
premature to conclude that the number of butts per suckling bout was not affected by the treatment in every circumstance. The study indeed
fails to show a very strong effect for this relationship, but based on the range of CIs, it is equally likely that a future study will find a zero or strong
effect. With this respect, the authors contrasted their results with that of another study (Haley et al. 1998) that showed a significant relationship
between butting rate and milk flow in the domestic cow (Bos taurus). However, when the comparison is based on effect sizes, the difference does
not seem very robust, as the 95% CIs largely overlap (b).
The relevance of effects sizes along a continuous scale is obvious in the first period of allosuckling, in which effect sizes decline with the order
of variables. The difference between effect sizes for rejected suckling attempts and for solicitation is similar to the difference between effect sizes
for rejected suckling attempts and for mean duration of suckling bout. A NHT-based interpretation would qualitatively distinguish these similar
differences because it would disregard the former difference (as both effect sizes correspond to a significant association), whereas it would only
contrast the nonsignificant treatment effect for the duration of suckling bout with the significant patterns found for the other 2 traits.
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nonindependence have improved the estimation of pooled ef-
fect sizes and CIs without bias (Verdu´ and Traveset 2005; Adams
2008; Lajeunesse 2009). These statistics intergrate phylogenetic
information into all the traditional meta-analytical tools, such
as using fixed- and random-effects models for pooling effect
sizes and calculating CIs and testing for homogeneity of varian-
ces (Lajeunesse 2009). In addition, these statistics emphasize
a generalized least squares approach that uses AIC scores to fit
different evolutionary hypotheses (e.g., Brownian motion or
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process) to the meta-analytic data.
DATA QUALITY AND REPEATABILITY
Statistical analyses rely on available data. Therefore, the
choices of statistical approaches and the interpretation of
results should consider not only analytical issues but also
data quality. If the statistical analysis does not account for
the requirements imposed by the nature of the data (e.g.,
assumptions concerning the distribution of data), the statis-
tical outcome will be biased or false. If the analyses use un-
reliable data that do not reflect the biological phenomenon
of interest (e.g., the use of absolute brain size without
correcting for body size to reflect cognitive abilities, see
Martin and Harvey 1985), the results of the study will pro-
vide misleading conclusions even if they seem statistically
meaningful.
When studying animal behavior, we generally rely on the
strong assumption that a behavior, or its predictor, is an indi-
vidual-specific attribute. The statistical consequence of this as-
sumption is that mean individual values of traits are used in the
analyses. However, within-individual, or more broadly, within-
subject variation cannot be inherently neglected, as it can have
biological meaning on one hand and can also invalidate statis-
tical results that are based on mean values on the other hand.
Statistically, within-subject variation can be described by re-
peatability (e.g., between observers, between measurements,
between data sources, within individuals or species), which
influences the replicability of the main findings and the extent
to which we can trust subject-specific mean values (Lessells and
Boag 1987). Repeatability approximates the amount to which
between-subject (e.g., between-individual or between-species)
variation relates to total variation. High repeatability means
that individuals always produce more or less the same mea-
sured value (Hayes and Jenkins 1997), whereas low repeatabil-
ity indicates that the trait displays considerable within-subject
variation or that our measurement is prone to sampling errors
(see below). When using NHT, the significance of repeatabil-
ity will be the probability value associated with the subject
factor in the ANOVA table, although the repeatability value
itself is a derived metric that requires further calculations
(Lessells and Boag 1987). Additional formulas exist to calcu-
late SEs and 95% CIs around repeatability (Becker 1984).
In behavioral ecology, within-subject variation may increase
due to several biological and technical reasons, so calculating
repeatability and balancing between number of subjects and
the number of trials/measurements within subjects seem par-
ticularly important tasks. First, observed behaviors in animals
are the results of extremely complex mechanisms, as they are
influenced by several intrinsic (i.e., neural, endocrine, and ge-
netic effects) and extrinsic (i.e., physical and social environ-
ments) factors (Danchin et al. 2008). Therefore, behavioral
traits like features of song, cognitive performance traits, for-
aging or personality traits are usually displayed with great in-
dividual flexibility and variability even across consecutive
observations, which result in lower repeatability than in the
case of morphological traits (Garamszegi et al. 2006a). A re-
cent meta-analysis relying on more than 700 repeatability
estimates of behavioral traits revealed that the average
repeatability across all estimates is below 0.4 (Bell et al.
2009). Hence, modest repeatability is an inherent and ex-
pected feature of many variables used in our field. It is in-
triguing that although many studies in behavioral ecology
characterize the determinants of the mean expression of in-
dividual behaviors, few focus on within-individual variation.
This suggests that the conceptual questions of interest have
concerned the average behavior across individuals, rather
than the variation within these individuals (i.e., behavioral
characterization of populations rather than individuals). Sec-
ond, traits can vary with time because they may be exhibited
differently during different times of the day or during differ-
ent parts of the breeding season, or depending on the indi-
vidual’s state, all of which increase within-individual variation.
Similarly, behavioral variation can occur due to spatial hetero-
geneity. Third, in the interspecific context of comparative
studies, within-species trends are of importance for shaping
within-subject variation (Harvey and Pagel 1991). For exam-
ple, differences between populations, sexes, age-classes, or
individuals can all contribute to within-species variations
and thus reduce repeatability. In fact, the problem caused
by within-species variation in interspecific studies currently re-
ceives considerable attention in evolutionary biology (Harmon
and Losos 2005; Ives et al. 2007; Felsenstein 2008). Simula-
tions have demonstrated that when the data are structured by
phylogenetic relationships, low repeatability can cause type I
errors (i.e., spurious relationships; Harmon and Losos 2005).
Finally, measurement errors are also important causes of un-
wanted variation and noise, and they are of little, if any, bi-
ological relevance. Measurement error may not only be
caused by instrumental constraints, but we may also commit
mistakes and simplifications when we make calculations from
the raw measurements (Calhim and Birkhead 2007). More-
over, simulation shows that metrics that depict the extent
to which within- and between-subject variations relate to
each other are sensitive to perturbations in sampling design
(Pollard KA, unpublished data). We suspect that it is usually
a challenge to distinguish measurement error from biological
factors which reduce repeatability although there have been
developments in statistical methods dealing with measure-
ments errors (Congdon 2006).
Low repeatability is thus likely to represent an important
problem in behavioral ecology that deserves statistical treat-
ment. This is actually a dual task. First, we need statistical
approaches that are able to handle variation within the studied
objects. For example, formulas exist to correct for the down-
ward bias that low repeatability due to within-subject variation
raises in the calculation of correlation coefficients and regres-
sion slopes (Fan 2003; McArdle 2003; Adolph and Hardin
2007; see also Figure 5). If both dependent and independent
variables can be estimated at the case by case level within
subjects (i.e., multiple measurements are available within in-
dividuals), mixed-effects models allow analyses with the raw
data in which subject-specific effects can be followed through
the corresponding main factor without the need of calculat-
ing means at the subject level (van de Pol and Wright 2009).
Alternatively, one may calculate different measures of within-
subject variation and include them in statistical models to-
gether with mean values (e.g., van de Pol and Verhulst 2006;
Byers 2007; Dochtermann and Jenkins 2007). A further
complication is that not only mean values have a repeatability
but also slopes and this sometimes needs to be considered
(Schielzeth and Forstmeier 2009). Moreover, for problems
arising in a phylogenetic context, recently developed compar-
ative methods allow for the incorporation of within-species
variation into the evolutionary models (Ives et al. 2007;
Felsenstein 2008). These can be used to study interspecific
patterns of behaviors while simultaneously controlling for
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different sources of biases, such as phylogeny and within-
species variation.
Second, we must also deal with the fact that data quality can
vary across observations. A common underlying assumption of
most statistical approaches is that each data point provides
equally precise information about the deterministic part of to-
tal process variation, that is, the error term is constant over all
values of the predictor or explanatory variables (Sokal and
Rohlf 1995). If repeatability is modest, mean estimates derived
from a few observations will be less reliable than mean esti-
mates from larger within-subject samples. Therefore, if within-
subject sample size differs across subjects, it may be expected
that heterogeneity in data quality will be introduced in the
data set that uses mean values. The standard solution to vio-
lations of assumptions by heterogeneous data quality is to
weight each observation by sample size or another measure
of sampling effort (Draper and Smith 1981; Neter et al. 1996;
see Figure 5) or to use mixed models. Interestingly, this is
analogous and also statistically similar to what meta-analysis
does (i.e., weighting each effect size with corresponding sam-
ple size from which effect size is calculated).
Another common violation of statistical assumptions is het-
erogeneous data quality caused by the nonstandard data distri-
butions, such as a large proportion of zero values included in
the data. For example, parasite prevalence is a case in point
because many animals have no parasites at all, whereas others
may have heavy parasite load (Jovani and Tella 2006). Data
transformations in these cases do not work for normalization,
so it is required to employ special statistical methods to ana-
lyze zero-inflated data (Martin et al. 2005). Since the first re-
port on the analytic methods of the zero-inflated data
(Lambert 1992), several methods have been made available
(Martin et al. 2005). One of these, the 2-component model
(also called ‘‘hurdle’’ model) conducts 2 separate analy-
ses—the first analysis investigates factors predicting whether
the dependent term is zero or nonzero and the second one
investigates factors predicting nonzero values of the depen-
dent term using a truncated Poisson distribution (see
Cockburn et al. 2008). A different solution is to model the
zero-inflated data by using the discrete mixture model
(Lambert 1992; Welsh et al. 1996), constructing a single dis-
tribution out of 2 different discrete distributions—a mixture
of the Bernoulli distribution and a Poisson distribution (see
Charpentier et al. 2008 as an example; Lambert 1992; Welsh
et al. 1996). As discussed in a previous section, Bayesian meth-
ods are particularly suitable for implementing complex mod-
els such as the discrete mixture model and may more
effectively process variation in non-Gaussian data without
relying on transformations.
The problem of missing data, another aspect of data quality,
is a neglected topic in the field of ecology and evolution
(Hadfield 2008; Nakagawa and Freckleton 2008), although
missing data issues are probably present in most data sets
behavioral ecologists deal with. We usually delete missing
observations and work with complete cases. However, such
complete case analyses often lead to reduced statistical
power. In behavioral ecology, data sets are often small and
further reduction of power may be the last thing behavioral
ecologists need. Additionally, case-wise deletion can also
cause biases in parameter estimates, especially if missing data
occur nonrandomly as they are ‘‘missing’’ due to biological
reasons. For example, older animals or one specific sex may
be harder to catch, but even behavioral types can cause trap-
shy or trap-happy effects and thus biased sampling (Biro and
Dingemanse 2009; Garamszegi et al. 2009). Furthermore,
missing data threaten the validity of model selection, which-
ever selection methods are used. Fortunately, there have
been recent statistical advances in handling missing data to
alleviate these problems. Techniques such as multiple impu-
tations and data augmentation have become well accepted
in the statistical literature (Allison 2002; Little and Rubin
2002). Moreover, the Bayesian framework also offers
Figure 5
Adjusting for heterogeneity in data quality. Garamszegi et al. (2006b)
studied the physiological consequences of the production of sexually
selected traits using the collared flycatcher (Ficedula albicollis) as
a model to analyze the relationship between song traits and levels of
heat shock proteins (HSP 70) that mediate stress response. One focal
variable was song complexity, which is estimated as the number of
syllable types relative to the number of syllables within each song
produced. A field record usually contains several songs for each
individual, thus allowing multiple sampling within subjects. In the
study, 20 songs were obtained for each male. Subsequent tests were
performed by using the average of these measurements for each
male (dots). A correlation relying on individuals as the unit of
analysis did not reveal strong relationship between song complexity
and levels of HSP 70 (r ¼ 20.271, N ¼ 23, 95% CI ¼ 20.615/0.159,
P¼ 0.211, solid line). However, song complexity has only a moderate
repeatability (R ¼ 0.373, F22,437 ¼ 8.142, P , 0.001) indicating that
the trait displays a substantial within-individual variation, which is
neglected when using individual-specific means. Applying
a correction formula on the correlation coefficient that takes
repeatability into account (Adolph and Hardin 2007), the
relationship appears stronger (r ¼ 20.399, N ¼ 23, 95% CI ¼
20.697/0.016, P ¼ 0.059, when using R ¼ 0.5 for the repeatability of
HSP 70 based on Morales J, unpublished data on females).
Supposing that available sample size varies across males (e.g., for
some individuals less than ten songs could be recorded), the
reliability of data units differs. This is because trait values can be
estimated with larger errors if only few measurements are available
(error bars). If one corrects for this heterogeneity in data quality by
using weighted regression based on within-subject sample size, the
outcome might be different. In this example, we arbitrarily created
lower within-subject sample size for some males (by randomly
deleting some raw measurements) that deviate from the suspected
pattern and then downweighted their role in the regression analysis
by using statistical weights. This resulted in a stronger relationship
between the focal variables at the individual level (r ¼ 20.478, N ¼
23, 95% CI ¼ 20.744/20.082, P ¼ 0.021, dashed line). Note that in
this example, within-individual sample sizes were artificially modified
for illustrative purposes. It could equally occur that a correction for
unbalanced sampling has an effect in the other direction, in which
the weighted effect size is smaller than the effect sizes obtained based
on the individual specific means.
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approaches to treat missing data. We refer readers to a recent
article on missing data and associated statistical techniques
(see Nakagawa and Freckleton 2008; and references
therein).
TAKE-HOME MESSAGE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have discussed some major statistical issues that practicing
behavioral ecologists may frequently encounter. These issues
share at least 4 important features, along which our field is
likely to develop. First, all of these incorporate the common
philosophy that moving away from heavy reliance on statistical
significance is necessary, whereas more attention should be
paid to biological relevance with the appreciation that uncer-
tainty is an inherent feature of biological data. These uncer-
tainties can be handled through model averaging, posterior
distributions, CIs, and repeatability. Second, ‘‘new’’ ap-
proaches offer variable tools to amalgamate previous findings
or knowledge with the current analysis. Theoretical or obser-
vational evidence can drive decisions about the initial model
set in an IT framework or the prior distributions in Bayesian
statistics, whereas effect sizes stimulate meta-analytic design
to summarize related research findings. Third, each method
still involves methodological challenges and brings up new
problems to be solved. Particularly, the drawbacks and benefits
of available techniques are not fully understood in the context
of the evolutionary study of behavior, and we currently lack
a consistent statistical philosophy in behavioral ecology.
Fourth, none of the approaches should be overwhelmingly
and generally supported over each other or even traditional
approaches, as they provide means to treat particular but
not all statistical problems. Some features have not been widely
explored in association with data sets typical for behavioral
ecology, thus some care is needed when applying novel meth-
ods in our field. Additionally, more than one approach may
often seem applicable to a given analytical design, and the re-
searcher is left with the task of selecting among the available
methods.
Therefore, the methods added recently to the analytical ar-
senal of behavioral ecologists bring new and pluralistic statis-
tical concepts into our research focus. As the statistics chosen
can have strong implications for the biological conclusions, we
would like to stimulate the community to prepare for changes
in ecological statistics by statistical training and careful imple-
mentation and encourage researchers to test the applicability
of ‘‘new’’ methods in the specific designs we adopt in our field.
To enhance this process, we recommend some potentially use-
ful routes along which behavioral ecologists can improve the
integration of novel statistical concepts into their research
and reports. Readers may agree or disagree with these sugges-
tions, but at the least we advocate that researchers in our field
prepare for the changes we experience and expect in ecolog-
ical statistics.
In general, research practice should ideally echo the key sta-
tistical concepts emerging in ecological statistics. To be able to
make an objective statistical choice, we need to understand the
pros and cons of different methodologies. Instead of blindly
following a fashion, it is our responsibility to carefully evaluate
the available analytical approaches (both old and new) while
taking into account the question, the assumptions and the data
at hand. To achieve this, the task of researchers is that they per-
petually train themselves.
To make the analyses transparent, there are ways by which
we can ‘‘significantly’’ improve how we report data. Most im-
portantly, data presentation and interpretation can be made
more objective if they reflect the uncertainty with which esti-
mations of biological effects are associated. This may involve
the presentation of all statistical results, instead of the pref-
erential report of those beyond some threshold, which can
help the readers’ interpretation. For example, 1) researchers
using IT may want to report the full list of evaluated and
ranked models with the associated AIC scores (or parameter
weights); 2) summary statistics for the posterior distribution
(e.g., mean, SD, credible interval) from a Bayesian Markov
chain can be reported (together with figures showing chain
convergence), from which the exploration of parameter
space becomes clear; 3) for any presented biological effect
(even in the IT and Bayesian frameworks), both the standard-
ized effect sizes and the corresponding CIs can be given; and
4) the estimation of within-group repeatability of some
parameters is valuable and maybe of interest, especially if data
structure constrains us to eliminate within-subject variance by
calculating mean values. Furthermore, we can enhance data
presentation to help comparisons with previous and future
findings (e.g., in a meta-analysis). Electronic appendices
are now widely available for publishing excessive data or result
details.
We could also show progress in clarifying our statistical
decisions by providing clear reasoning behind each statistical
choice followed and by the careful examination of the under-
lying assumptions. If multiple approaches seem equally appli-
cable, their outcomes can be reported together (again
electronic appendix material can be used), and thus, the ro-
bustness of the results can be assessed. This may also apply in
cases when different settings are similarly plausible (i.e., dif-
ferent information criteria, candidate model sets, and prior
settings). Electronic appendices can also be used for the in-
clusion of raw data sets, which is not conventional in the field
of ecology and evolution but is so in other fields (American
Psychological Association 2001). Given the diversity of statis-
tical methods, making raw data available seems reasonable
and provides a potential solution to misinterpretations. Also,
such data depositions in public enrich our field and help it
progress, encouraging the testing of alternative explanations
and discouraging scientific fraud. This process seems obvi-
ous in relation to phylogenetic comparative studies, in which
the corresponding inter-specific data sets are becoming gen-
erally accessible. Another use of electronic appendices can
be that authors of theoretical papers can illustrate how their
new theories can be incorporated into real statistical models,
which rarely seems to happen.
To help statistical integration at different levels, we have cre-
ated BeStat (http://bestat.ecoinformatics.org) to encourage
the dissemination of statistical development among behav-
ioral ecologists. The aim of this web-project is to synchronize
statistical discussion and training based on a user-built infor-
mation source. This platform offers several functions which
can potentially help the transfer of knowledge, but its content
is left to be assembled by the entire community. We have
opened spaces for any kind of online discussion (Stat-Chat),
for the standard broadcasting of any statistical issue via lay
summaries and references (Stat-Sum), for the building of
electronic tutorials and examples (Stat-Wiki), and for hosting
statistical programs, resources, and links (Stat-Prog).
We emphasize that statistics are only tools to aid our inter-
pretations of data. As behavioral ecologists, we should remem-
ber to integrate knowledge of the biology and ecology of the
study species into statistical practices at all analytical stages.
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